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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-GAMBLER'S CLAIM OF SELF-INCRIM-
INATION PROVIDES COMPLETE DEFENSE TO PROSECUTIONS FOR
VIOLATION OF FEDERAL WAGERING TAx STATUTES. Marchetti
v. United States (U.S. 1968).
Petitioner was convicted in a United States district court on two
indictments charging wagering tax violations. The first indictment
charged petitioner with a conspiracy to evade payment of the annual
occupational tax imposed by Section 4411 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.1 The second indictment alleged willful failure to pay
the special occupational tax prior to entering the business of accepting
wagers and the willful failure to register prior to engaging in the
wagering business as required by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
Section 4412.2 Petitioner moved to arrest judgment on the ground
that the statutory obligation to pay the special occupational tax and
to register violated his fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed;3 however,
on certiorari to the Supreme Court,4 held, reversed: Those who assert
a valid fifth amendment privilege to the wagering tax statutes may
not be criminally punished for failure to comply with them. Marchetti
v. United States, 88 S.Ct. 697 (1968) .r
1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4411. Imposition of tax.
There shall be imposed a special tax of $50 per year to be paid by each
person who is liable for tax under section 4401 or who is engaged in receiving
wagers for or on behalf of any person so liable.
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4412. Registration.
(a) Requirement.
Each person required to pay a special tax under this subchapter shall register
with the official in charge of the internal revenue district-
(1) his name and place of residence;
(2) if he is liable for tax under subchapter A, each place of business where
the activity which makes him so liable is carried on, and the name and place
of residence of each person who is engaged in receiving wagers for him or
on his behalf; and
(3) if he is engaged in receiving wagers for or on behalf of any person
liable for tax under subchapter A, the name and place of residence of each
such person.
a United States v. Costello, 352 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1965). The original case bore
Costello's name, however he died in December 1966.
4 Certiorari was initially granted in Costello v. United States, 383 U.S. 942 (1966),
but upon Costello's death the Court granted certiorari to Marchetti, 385 U.S. 100
(1967). Certiorari was limited to the following questions: (1) Do not the federal
wagering tax statutes here involved violate the petitioner's privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment? (2) Should the Supreme Court,
in view of its recent decision in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382
U.S. 70 (1965), overrule United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), and Lewis
v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955) ?
5 Grosso v. United States was argued with 2Marchetl. Grosso was charged with
violation of the 10 percent excise tax placed upon gamblers. The issues and holdings
are similar in the two cases, therefore they have been combined and discussed together
for simplification.
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Prior to Marchetti only two Supreme Court cases, United States v.
Kahrigere and Lewis v. United States,7 questioned the validity of the
gambler's registration and tax statutes. In Kahriger the charge was
failure to pay the occupational tax and failure to register, whereas in
Lewis the charge was only violation of the occupational tax. In both
cases the Supreme Court concluded that the privilege against self-
incrimination could not be asserted to defeat the taxing and registra-
tion statutes.
The Kahriger-Lewis rationale had rested primarily on a theory of
waiver and the determination that the fifth amendment privilege
only applied to past acts completed. In advancement of the waiver
theory, the Kahriger Court held that the defendant lost his right to
the protection of the fifth amendment when he failed to make a
return. The Court stated that he could have raised any objection in
the return, but failure to file a return waived any objection he might
have otherwise had.8 The Supreme Court in Marchetti was unwilling
to accept this reasoning and held that Marchetti's claiming of the
privilege at and after the trial was a substantial effort to invoke the
fifth amendment.' To hold contrary "one would be required to prove
guilt to avoid admitting it."'1 The Marchetti Court ruled that it
would violate the privilege if the individual must first incriminate
himself in his return in order to claim the protection of the fifth
amendment.
A variation of the waiver theory, expressed in Lewis, evolves from
the reasoning that the occupational tax requirements do not compel
self-incrimination, but merely impose on the gambler the initial
choice of whether he wishes, at the cost of his constitutional privi-
lege, to commence wagering activities. The Lewis Court stated there
is neither a constitutional right to gamble, nor a compulsion to engage
in the wagering business. Therefore, any individual who chooses to
enter wagering activities is dearly warned in advance that he will be
required to provide information which he might otherwise prefer to
6 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
7 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
8 345 U.S. at 32. The Kahriger Court relied on United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S.
259 (1927). In Sullivan the taxpayer, who made his money through dealings in the
illicit traffic of liquors, abstained from making a tax return. His conviction, for failure
to make a return of his net income, was upheld over his claim of fifth amendment
protection.
9 88 S. Ct. 697, 704 (1968).
10 345 U.S. at 34 (concurring opinion) Justice Jackson concurred reluctantly only
because the minority could not agree upon a single dissenting opinion.
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withhold."1 The Marchetti Court held that this line of reasoning was
erroneous: "The question is not whether petitioner holds a right to
violate state law, but, whether having done so, he may be compelled
to give evidence against himself."' 2 The constitutional privilege was
intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent
and foresighted; thus one who has violated the law may not be
forced to give evidence against himself.'"
The second major premise of Kahriger and Lewis was that the
privilege extended only to past acts completed and not to future
acts. 4 The Marchetti Court found this holding to be without prece-
dent and based solely upon a generalization by Professor Wigmore
to the effect that the fifth amendment did not apply to a restricted
class of prospective acts.15 The principal reason for not following the
Kahriger and Lewis holdings was that they overlooked the risk of
incrimination to past and present acts which might result from an
investigation prompted by the disclosure of an intent to gamble in
the future.
One standard for the application of the privilege is whether the
claimant is confronted with a real and substantial danger-not merely
trifling or imaginary hazards of incrimination.' In the instant case
petitioner's apprehension of danger was greatly enhanced by Section
6107 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,'. which provides that
11 348 U.S. at 423-24. Disclosures, often highly detailed, are required under federal
law of those who choose to engage in many occupations. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1940)
(investment advisers); 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1934) (radio stations); 49 U.S.C. § 1371
(1962) (air carriers); 2 U.S.C. § 267 (1946) (lobbyists); 29 U.S.C. § 432 (1959)
(officers and employees of labor organizations).
12 88 S. Ct. at 704.
13 Id.
14 On the form now in use, Form 11C, adopted subsequent to the decisions in
Kahriger and Lewis, the questions are phrased in the alternative, e.g., "Do you receive
or will you be receiving wagers on behalf of or as agent for some other person or
persons ?"
15 8 J. WiGmom, EVIDENCE § 2259c (3d ed. 1940). "[Ijhere is no compulsory
self-incrimination in a rule of law which merely requires beforehand a future report on
a class of future acts among which a particular one may or may not in the future be
criminal at the choice of the party reporting." This generalization was last reported in
Wigmore's 1940 edition and was dropped in subsequent revisions.
16 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Rogers v. United States,
340 U.S. 367, 372 (1951); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913); Brown
v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896); United States v. Costello, 222 F.2d 656, 661
(1955); United States v. Doto, 205 F.2d 416, 417 (1953); Kiewel v. United States,
204 F.2d 1, 4 (1953).
17 Iir. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 6107. List of special taxpayers for public inspection.
In the principal internal revenue office in each internal revenue district there
shall be kept, for public inspection, an alphabetical list of the names of all
persons who have paid special taxes .... Such list ... shall contain the time,
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the names of those who comply with the wagering tax statutes shall
be made available to interested prosecuting authorities. Petitioner's
claim was asserted in an area permeated with criminal statutes where
response to any of the questions on the form might subject him to
criminal prosecution.' Surely, Marchetti's claim of privilege was
made in the face of a substantial danger of incrimination.
Another standard for determining when the privilege attaches is
where the required information furnishes a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute.' 9
The privilege against self-incrimination not only extends to
answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a
federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the
claimant for a federal crime.20
From Chief Justice John Marshall's first influential interpretation of
the privilege in United States v. Burr'1 to the Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncement in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Board,22 the link-in-the-evidentiary-chain doctrine has been firmly
fixed. The Kahriger-Lewis rationale that representations of intent to
engage in criminal activity do not incriminate is contrary to the link-
in-the-chain principle so well established in constitutional doctrine.
Assuming the questions on the registration form pertain to future
intent only,2" the disclosed intent certainly qualifies as at least an
investigatory guide that could lead to prosecutions for both federal
and state crimes. In United States v. Zizzo,24 the defendant was
charged with traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to
place, and business for which such special taxes have been paid, and upon
application of any prosecuting officer of any state, county, or municipality there
shall be furnished to him a certified copy thereof ....
18 Form 11C asks the name and address of the individual, if the individual plans to
carry on gambling activities, who works for and accepts bets for the individual and the
addresses of the individual's employees.
Connecticut, the state in which Marchetti was indicted, punishes under CoNN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 53-295 (1958) any person, whether as principal, agent, or servant, who
owns, possesses, keeps, manages, maintains or occupies premises employed for purposes
of wagering or pool selling. See § 53-298 which punishes any person who becomes the
custodian of books, property, appliances, or apparatus employed for wagering activities.
See also §§ 53-293, 54-197, 53-295, 53-298.
19 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 200 (1954); Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 159, 161 (1950).
20 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
21 25 F. Cas. (No. 14692e) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
22 382 U.S. at 78.
2 See note 14 supra.
24 338 F.2d 577, 580 (1964).
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engage in gambling activities in violation of federal law. His con-
viction was based partly upon evidence of compliance with the same
statutes as those involved in Marchetti. Similar evidence was used in
Irvine v. California2 to convict the defendant of violating a Califor-
nia gambling statute. 6
The overruling of Kahriger and Lewis was thus largely attributable
to the Marchetti Court's realization that a gambler may face a real
and substantial danger by compliance with the wagering statutes, and
furthermore, that compliance with these statutes could be a major
"link" in the chain of evidence for both federal and state convictions.
After invalidating the Kahriger-Lewis holdings the Court con-
sidered the applicability of the "required records" doctrine of Shapiro
v. United States,2r which rejected the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion as a basis for refusing disclosure of records deemed public. In
Shapiro, the defendant was required to keep various records pursuant
to a regulation issued under the authority of the Emergency Price
Control Act. When later directed by an administrative subpoena to
produce these records Shapiro complied, but asserted his constitu-
tional privilege. On certiorari the Supreme Court held that Shapiro
could not claim the protection of the privilege as to records which he
was required to maintain by administrative regulation. To qualify as
"required records" three elements must be present: 1) they must be
documents which the defendant was required to keep; 2) they must
not be for private use, but rather for the benefit of the public; and
3) the records must be open to public inspection.18 There are signifi-
cant differences between Shapiro and Marchetti which preclude the
application of the "required records" doctrine to the latter. Marchetti
was not required to keep and preserve records but simply to provide
information about his wagering activities. Also, there were no public
aspects to the information demanded from Marchetti, and the govern-
ment's anxiety to acquire information known to a private individual
does not, without more, render that information public. Further, the
requirements imposed in Shapiro were in an essentially non-criminal
area of inquiry while those in Marchetti were directed at a selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities.
25 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
26 See Grigsby v. Mitchum, 191 Kan. 293, 380 P.2d 363 (1963); State v. Forsyth,
229 La. 690, 86 So. 2d 536 (1956); State v. Reinhardt, 229 La. 674, 86 So. 2d 530
(1956); State v. Mills, 229 La. 758, 86 So. 2d 895 (1956); State v. Curry, 92 Ohio
App. 1, 109 N.E.2d 298 (1952); Commonwealth v. Fiorini, 202 Pa. Super. 88, 195
A.2d 119 (1963); McClary v. State, 211 Tenn. 46, 362 S.W.2d 450 (1962).
27 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
28 Id. at 17.
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The Government argued and Chief Justice Warren in dissent took
the view, that if the Court should find the Kahriger-Lewis rational
no longer valid, the remedy would be to uphold the wagering and
registration statutes but bar further criminal use of the information
obtained. By invalidating section 6107 and adopting an exclusionary
rule there no longer would be any danger of self-incrimination in
complying with the statutes and the privilege would not be applic-
able.29 This line of argument was based on the rationale of Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission30 where witnesses were subpoened to
testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New
York concerning a work stoppage. The witnesses refused to respond
to certain questions about the stoppage on the ground that the
answers might tend to incriminate them. The Court granted them
immunity from future prosecution based on the elicited information,
thereby holding the witnesses compellable to answer. However, the
Marchetti Court held that an exclusionary rule similar to that in
Murphy could not be adopted in the instant situation, because it
would contradict the controlling intent of Congress in passing the
wagering tax laws.3' The Marchetti Court concluded that the primary
intent of Congress was to provide prosecuting authorities with in-
formation obtained through compliance with the tax statutes3
Chief Justice Warren took particular issue with this point arguing
that Congress had not one, but two major goals in enacting the
statutes: to aid prosecuting authorities and to raise revenue 3 As the
majority ruled, both purposes of the taxing system were destroyed.
The Marchetti Court emphasized that they did not hold the wager-
ing tax provisions constitutionally impermissible, but only that those
who properly assert the fifth amendment privilege may not be crimi-
nally punished for failure to comply with their requirements. Thus,
the tax statutes remain constitutional; yet, the majority of those at
whom the tax is aimed need not comply.
DONALD ERNEST WRIGHTON
29 "Once the reason for the privilege ceases, the privilege ceases." UlIman v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 (1956).
30 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
31 88 S. Ct. at 708.
82 Mr. Justice Brennan laid additional emphasis upon this aspect in his concurring
opinion. "Whatever else Congress may have meant to achieve, an obvious purpose of
this statutory system clearly was to coerce evidence from persons engaged in illegal
activities for use in their prosecution:' 88 S. Ct. at 717.
38 Id. at 721.
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